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may be admissible, within proper limits, by analogy to rules governing
the keeping of books and records generally. Cline v. Evans, 127
W. Va. 113, 31 S.E.2d. 681 (1944). In the later case of Keller
v. Wonn, 140 W. Va. 860, 87 S.E.2d. 453 (1955), the court, with-
out spelling out a rule applicable to all entries in hospital records,
was of the opinion that routine entries and perhaps ordinary diagnostic
findings, based upon objective data and not presenting a question of
obvious difficult interpretation, should be admitted. For a compar-
ision of the existing West Virginia law and the provisions of the
Uniform Act, see 60 W. VA. L. REv. 321, 328 (1958).
The conclusions of the majority of the court in principal case
seem to be in accord with the present day liberal construction of
the shop-book rule. The West Virginia Supreme Court has taken
steps in this direction but it would appear that the adoption of the
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act would greatly clarify
this area of admissibility of evidence.
Eugene Triplett Hague, Jr.
Federal Courts-Diversity Jurisdiction by Assignment-
Improper or Collusive.
P was sole stockholder of an insolvent corporation. The corpo-
ration assigned to P all claims which the corporation had or might
have against D. In consideration thereof, P had paid, or orally
agreed to pay, a substantial part of the corporation's indebtedness.
The corporation and D were of like citizenship while P was a citizen
of another state. The assignment was made for the purpose of gain-
ing admission to the federal court on diversity. The trial court held
that it did have jurisdiction, but certified the question to the circuit
court as one where there was "substantial grounds for difference of
opinion". Held, affirmed. The assignment was not "improper or
collusive" within the meaning of 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1359 (1958), because P had paid, or agreed to pay, the debts of
an insolvent corporation as consideration for the assignment. Until
the time of the challenged assignment P was not the sole owner of
the claim against D and was not the real party in interest. Bradbury
v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1962).
As the instant case is another example of an assignment that
is not "collusive or improper", even though it was made for the
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purpose of obtaining diversity jurisdiction, the question arises as to
what is considered collusive? From the instant case it would seem
that so long as there is consideration given, the assignment would
meet the standard of a "proper" assignment, irrespective of the
reason for it.
The assignee clause was first enacted in the original Judiciary
Act of 1789. The history of the clause shows that its purpose and
effect at the time of its enactment was to prevent the conferring of
jurisdiction on the federal courts, on grounds of diversity of citizen-
ship, by assignment, in cases where it would not otherwise exist.
Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 449 (1925). Thus, under
the original assignee clause if a citizen of one state had a claim
against another, who was also a citizen of that same state, he could
not transfer that claim to a citizen of another state in order to obtain
diversity of citizenship. The purpose of the assignee clause was to
prevent, by mere colorable assignment to a non-resident, easy access
to the federal courts on the basis of diversity of citizenship where this
access would not have been available to the assignor. Joseph Miele
Const. Co. v. City of Niagara Falls, 21 F. Supp. 442 (W.D. N.Y.
1937). The court in the Joseph Miele Const. Co. case was refer-
ing to the asignee clause as it existed until its repeal in 1948. How-
ever, at this time, the federal courts would grant jurisdiction even
though the subject matter of the suit had been transferred for the
purpose of giving jurisdiction, providing there had been a bona fide
sale and transfer by which the transferee became the real owner and
thereby the party to the suit. Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U.S. 280
(1868). Where a chose in action was transferred to a non-resident
for value, the interest of the assignor entirely ceasing, the fact that
one of the purposes of the transfer was to create a diversity of citizen-
ship so as to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts did not render the transaction collusive. Cross v. Allen, 141
U.S. 528 (1891).
The assignee clause did not refer to suits upon new and original
contracts and promises, but referred rather to suits upon assigned
chose in actions. While the term "chose in action" is one of all
inclusive meaning and in one sense embraces all rights of action, to
give such a comprehensive meaning to the term would have given
the assignee clause a far wider scope than was necessary to achieve
its objective. Brown v. Flecher, 235 U.S. 589 (1915). Thus a
transfer of a property interest did not give rise to a "chose in ac-
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tion" as this term was used in this statute. Peterson v. Sucro, 93
F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1938).
As the assignee clause dealt with the bona fide assignee there
has been much litigation to determine the assignments which should
or should not be within the purview of the clause. Thus the courts have
thought it advisable to limit the term "chose in action" and exclude
from its scope (1) an implied in law duty or promise, and (2) a
transfer of a property interest, and to exclude an assignment by oper-
ation of law from the coverage of the clause. H. R. Rep. No. 308,
80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948).
Until the repeal of the assignee clause by the Judicial Code and
Judiciary Revision Act of 1948, the assignee clause restricted, some-
times severely, federal juridiction based upon diversity and alienage.
3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 17.06 (2d ed. 1948). The assignee
clause said that, in addition to looking to the citizenship of the
assignee, the real party in interest, the court must also look to the
citizenship of his assignor. In other words, in order for the assignee-
plaintiff to bring his action in federal court his assignor must also
have had the right to do so. Thus, in cases coming within the
restriction of the clause there must have been jurisdiction to sup-
port the asisgnee's case and a showing that there would have been
jurisdiction if the assignor had brought the action rather than the
asignee. 36 Stat. 1091 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1) (1940).
Since the adoption of the Erie doctrine, requiring the federal
court to apply the same substantive law that is applied by the high-
est state court in which it sits, the most obvious reason for obtaining
federal jurisdiction, that is, for a different rule of law, has been
removed. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Neverthe-
less, there are still inducements to carry litigation to the federal
courts. These inducements could involve the application of differ-
ent procedure rules which would give the plaintiff a substantial
advantage, a more liberal jury selected over a wider area, or the speed
in which a particular court may resolve a case.
The assignee clause was omitted when the Federal Judicial
Code was revised in 1948. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act
of 1948, 62 Stat. 992. The difficulty encountered in construing the
clause had engendered criticism of that provision. See note, 35 ILL.
L. REv. 569 (1941). The 1948 change made it possible for the
assignee to resort to the federal courts without regard to the citizen-
ship of his assignor. However, a limitation remains in that an
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assignee may not be "improperly or collusively" joined or made a
party in order to obtain federal jursidiction. The assignee must have
a real party interest in the claim before he may obtain federal jur-
isdiction. But, since it has long been held that where there is an
actual sale and transfer of the subject matter of the suit, the fact
that it was made for the purpose of giving jurisdiction to the federal
court is immaterial, the question arises as to what is "collusive"?
See Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 106 U.S. 327 (1895).
The code in 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1958),
states that, "a district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil
action in which any party by assignment or otherwise, has been im-
properly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of
the court". It would seem that the federal courts have been very
liberal in allowing claims to be transferred. It was held in a recent
case that the fact the party plaintiff had been solicited to bring the
suit, and had been indemnified against liability for costs and fees was
not enough to make a case collusive so as to deprive the federal
court of jurisdiction. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas.
Co. 204 F. Supp. 83, (D. Conn. 1962).
The federal courts in their definitions of "collusively" and "im-
properly" have given the words a very narrow interpretation. It
has been stated that the term "collusion" indicates a secret agree-
ment and co-operation for a fraudulent purpose, but the use of a state
statute to obtain diversity of judisdiction even though the object might
be a high verdict in a federal court is not "collusive" within the mean-
ing of the section. Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3rd
Cir. 1959). The same court defined the word "improperly" as con-
noting impropriety, but said it was not intended to prohibit the
creation of federal diversity jurisdiction where a resident admin-
istratrix in a death action resigned and a non-resident administrator
was appointed for the express purpose of creating diversity of citizen-
ship between the parties and jurisdiction of the federal court. Corabi
v. Auto Racing, Inc., supra.
From these cases, it would seem that the phrase "improperly
or collusively made or joined" is meaningless in light of the inter-
pretation the courts have given it. Perhaps the Congress should
eliminate the section altogether and allow admission into federal
courts to any party who has a right to bring an action, or if Congress
does not wish to do this it should rewrite the statute and define what
it means by improper and collusive.
Earl Moss Curry, Jr.
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